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Abstract 
 
The success of media campaigns depends in part on the extent to which transmitted 
communications are effective in changing the attitudes, and also on whether these 
modified attitudes in turn influence peoples' behaviors over time.  In this review, we 
describe two core processes that have proven to be highly useful in understanding how 
attitudes change or resist change: elaboration and validation.  The concept of 
elaboration distinguishes between processes that require high versus low effortful 
thinking, and highlights the importance of considering the amount and direction of 
people’s thoughts in determining their attitudes.  The concept of validation emphasizes 
the distinction between primary and secondary cognition, and emphasizes the 
importance of considering what people think and feel about their own thoughts and 
attitudes.  We describe how each of these two processes influences attitudes toward a 
variety of objects and activities ranging from evaluating consumer products, brands, and 
forms of entertainment, to attitudes toward playing videogames, and watching violent 
television shows.  We also address the practical implications of these concepts for 
understanding implicit attitudes and attitude structure.  
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Every year, governments, agencies, and companies spend billions of dollars in 
attempts to change peoples' attitudes about social policies, political candidates, 
consumer products, health and safety practices, and charitable causes.  The 
technological advances of the last century have made it possible not only for 
institutional, but also for individual communicators to have constant access to 
unprecedented numbers of potential message recipients.  In most of these instances, the 
ultimate goal is to influence peoples' behavior so that they will vote for certain 
politicians or proposals, purchase products, engage in safer activities, or donate money 
to various causes.  The success of media campaigns depends in part on the extent to 
which transmitted communications are effective in changing the attitudes of the 
recipients in the desired direction, and also on whether these modified attitudes in turn 
influence peoples' behaviors over time.  Our goal in this chapter is to present a brief 
overview of two critical psychological processes that can be used to understand mass 
media attitude change.   
Specifically, in this review we describe two core processes that have proven to 
be highly useful in understanding how attitudes are structured and how they change or 
resist change over time.  We begin with an analysis of the role of elaboration processes 
and then describe the role of validation processes.  After briefly describing each of these 
processes, we discuss their interrelationship, including applications of these approaches 
to understanding attitudes toward a variety of objects ranging from consumer products 
to people, and groups.  Understanding attitude formation and change is key to 
understanding which behaviors people enact, and as we will see, the processes of 
elaboration and validation are central to understanding the relationship between 
attitudes and behavior (Petty & Briñol, 2014). 
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After explicating elaboration and validation processes, we first demonstrate the 
utility of these concepts by exploring a common persuasion technique – matching the 
source or the message to the target of influence.  To provide an illustration particularly 
relevant to the study of media psychology, we address how aggressive people playing 
violent videogames can create a “match” and thereby influence attitudes and persuasion 
through these two processes, leading to a variety of paradoxical effects.  After this, we 
outline the importance of considering the concepts of elaboration and validation in order 
to understand a number of other phenomena related to attitude structure and behavior 
change.   
Elaboration  
Elaboration is a core construct in the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), one of the earliest dual process theories 
that distinguished thoughtful from non-thoughtful determinants of judgment (see 
Chaiken & Trope, 1999).  Since the introduction of this model there has been an 
explosion of dual process and dual system theories of potential relevance for 
understanding attitudes (see Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014), though much 
persuasion research remains guided by the ELM.  The ELM proposes that attitudes, as 
well as other judgments, can be modified by processes that involve relatively high or 
low amounts of issue or object-relevant thinking or elaboration, but the processes and 
consequences of persuasion are different depending on the amount of thought involved.
1
  
Furthermore, the ELM holds that there are numerous specific processes of attitude and 
belief change that operate along the elaboration continuum.  For example, classical 
conditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958) requires relatively little thought and operates at the 
low end of the continuum, but expectancy-value models of attitudes (e.g., Fishbein & 
                                                 
1
 Strictly speaking, elaboration refers to thinking in which the person adds something of their own to the 
information provided (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Since in practice, nearly all thinking involves some 
elaboration, we use the terms interchangeably. 
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Ajzen, 1975) require high degrees of thought and operate along the upper end of the 
continuum.  The mental processes that occur along the low end of the continuum are 
collectively referred to as following the peripheral route to persuasion whereas the 
operation of processes along the high end of the continuum are collectively referred to 
as following the central route to persuasion.   
Whether attitude change occurs as the result of relatively high or low amounts of 
thinking matters not only for determining what attitude is formed, but it also determines 
how consequential or strong that attitude is (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995, for a review of 
attitude strength research).  The impact of elaboration on attitude change and attitude 
strength has proven useful not only in the laboratory (Petty & Briñol, 2012), but also in 
a variety of applied communication contexts, such as advertising (Haugtvedt & Kasmer, 
2008; Rucker, Petty, & Priester, 2007), health communication (Briñol, & Petty, 2006; 
Petty, Barden & Wheeler, 2009), mass media communication (Petty, Briñol, & Priester, 
2009), and social marketing (Rucker, Petty, & Briñol, in press).   
First, consider how elaboration relates to what particular attitude is formed as a 
result of exposure to a persuasive message. A common finding in research guided by the 
ELM is that when people think carefully about a communication, their attitudes are 
influenced by their assessment of the substantive argument provided, but when they are 
relatively unmotivated or unable to think, attitudes are influenced by simple cues in the 
persuasion setting that allow for a quick (even automatic) judgment.  This is a first 
testable prediction for media researchers. In one prototypical early study (Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), students were exposed to a communication advocating a 
new campus policy.  The new policy was said to go into effect either next year so that it 
would affect all of the students or in 10 years when it would affect none of them.  The 
message the students received either contained strong or weak arguments.  The source 
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of the message was either portrayed as an expert on the topic or a person of low 
credibility.  The key result was that when the exam proposal was set to take place next 
year, motivating high thinking, the students were more persuaded by the strong than the 
weak arguments, but the credibility of the source made no difference.  On the other 
hand, when the exam proposal was not set to take effect for 10 years, reducing 
motivation to think, all that affected attitudes was the credibility of the source.  The 
merits of the arguments had no effect.  This research suggested that the high and low 
thinking individuals followed different routes to persuasion.  And, which attitude was 
formed (relatively favorable or unfavorable toward the proposal), was affected by which 
route to persuasion was followed. For example, if a message contained weak arguments 
but had a highly credible source, individuals who were not thinking much were 
relatively favorable toward the proposal but individuals who were thinking carefully 
were relatively unfavorable. 
In addition to affecting the extent of attitude change, elaboration is also 
important in affecting attitude strength.  Specifically, the more a judgment is based on 
thinking, the more it tends to persist over time, resist attempts at change, and perhaps 
most importantly, have consequences for other judgments and behavior (Petty, 
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).  This is a second testable prediction for media researchers.  
Prior research clearly indicates that attitudes based on high thought predict behavioral 
intentions and behavior better than attitudes based on little thought (e.g., Barden & 
Petty, 2008; Brown, 1974; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Leippe & Elkin, 
1987; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). Put simply, the more an attitude change is 
based on extensive thought, the stronger that attitude is.  Thus, even if high and low 
thinking processes resulted in the same degree of attitude change, the consequences of 
this influence in terms of stability and further impact on behavior can be different.  For 
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example, if people received a message with strong arguments from a credible source, 
they might be relatively favorable toward it regardless of whether they were engaged in 
high or low amounts of thinking.  But, the change induced via high amounts of thinking 
about the strong arguments would be more persistent, resistant to change, and predictive 
of behavior than the same change induced by low thinking (e.g., when the credible 
source served as a simple positive cue (e.g., see Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992).  
As another illustration of the elaboration-strength link, consider how the extent 
of elaboration can be applied to understanding the long term consequences of changes 
in prejudiced attitudes.  Governments and policy makers invest millions of dollars in 
developing effective social marketing campaigns to reduce prejudiced attitudes and 
discrimination against members of minority groups (e.g., see Maio, Haddock, Watt, & 
Hewstone, 2009).  Importantly, the accumulated work on prejudice formation and 
reduction has suggested that attitudes toward minority groups can be influenced by a 
variety of both low and high deliberation processes.  On the low thinking end of the 
continuum are techniques based on mere exposure to members of stigmatized groups 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and classical conditioning in which stigmatized group 
members are associated with other positive things (Dovidio, Gaertner & Kawakami, 
2003).  Indeed, many contemporary theories of prejudice presumably focused on these 
subtle and low thought processes of change because modern prejudice itself was 
thought to be subtle and covert (e.g., Dovidio, 2001).  However, low effort processes 
are not the only means of modifying prejudiced attitudes.  For example, based on the 
assumption that ignorance promotes prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 1984), Pettigrew 
(1998) proposed that “learning about others” is a critical step in how intergroup contact 
improves intergroup relations (Allport, 1954).  In accord with this view, there are 
numerous examples of how prejudice can be reduced by attendance at diversity group 
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seminars, and learning new substantive information about other social groups (Rudman, 
Ashmore & Gary, 2001).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that strategies such as intergroup contact 
might improve intergroup attitudes compared to no group contact through both low 
deliberation (e.g., mere exposure) as well as high deliberation (e.g., thinking about and 
learning new information) processes.  As already noted, the ELM predicts that the 
process by which prejudice is created or transformed is consequential for the strength of 
the attitude (Petty, et al., 1995).   
A recent set of studies demonstrated the importance of considering the concept 
of elaboration in designing media campaigns to reduce prejudiced attitudes.  
Specifically, Cárdaba, Briñol, Horcajo, and Petty (2013) presented participants with a 
persuasive message composed of compelling arguments in favor of a minority group or 
with a control message, and varied the targets’ ability and motivation to think about the 
message presented.  The results showed that even when the obtained attitude change 
was equivalent under low and high thinking conditions, there were important benefits of 
high elaboration prejudice reduction.  That is, although both high and low thinking 
processes were associated with a reduction in the extremity of prejudiced attitudes, the 
reductions in prejudice produced by high thinking processes were more persistent and 
resistant to subsequent attacks than equivalent changes produced by less thoughtful 
mechanisms (see also Cárdaba, et al., in press).  As this research demonstrates, 
understanding the nature of the processes by which attitudes change is essential because 
it informs us about the long-term consequences of attitude change.   
In sum, the ideas of the ELM outlined in this section (i.e., that attitudes can vary 
in their extent of thought; that attitudes can be affected with high or low thought; and 
that the extent of thought relates to how consequential the attitudes are) have 
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applicability not only in media campaigns but also in any situation in which persuasion 
is desired (e.g., the courtroom). Across the different domains of applicability, attitudes 
that were modified through relatively thoughtful processes were shown to be more 
stable, resistant to further change, and predictive of behavior compared to changes 
induced through less thoughtful means. As noted, this is a concrete, testable prediction 
that can be easily examined by other media researchers in different contexts.  
Given the importance of elaboration in persuasion, a large number of variables 
have been identified that can influence attitudes by affecting people's general motivation 
or ability to think about a mass media communication (see Petty, Briñol, & Priester, 
2009, for a review).  For example, distraction in the situation reduces one’s ability to 
process a message so that distraction reduces persuasion if the arguments in a 
persuasive message are strong (since favorable thoughts are disrupted), but increases 
persuasion if the arguments are weak (since unfavorable thoughts are disrupted (Petty, 
Wells, & Brock, 1976).  In contrast, repeating a message increases the ability to process 
it by providing greater opportunities to do so making messages with strong arguments 
more persuasive but messages with weak arguments less persuasive (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1979).  With respect to motivation, perhaps the most studied variable is the personal 
relevance of the communication.  By increasing the personal relevance of a message, 
people can become more motivated to scrutinize the evidence carefully such that if the 
evidence is found to be strong, more persuasion results, but if the evidence is found to 
be weak, less persuasion occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).  In fact, linking the message 
to almost any aspect of the self such as one’s values, one’s outcomes, one’s self-
conception, one’s identity, and so forth can enhance self-relevance and thereby increase 
the extent of information processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Fleming and Petty, 
2000). 
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Furthermore, it is worth nothing that the very same variable can increase 
elaboration for some people but decrease elaboration for others.  For example, 
introducing rhetorical questions in a communication can increase elaboration for people 
with low motivation to process by encouraging them to think about the questions raised, 
but the addition of questions in a message for people already thinking intently disrupts 
that elaboration (Petty, Cacioppo, & Heesacker, 1981; Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2003).  
Similarly, including cartoons, and jokes in a communication can increase elaboration in 
low thinking conditions but disrupt elaboration in high thinking conditions (Cline & 
Kellaris, 1999).  
In more recent research illustrating this possibility, Cancela, Briñol, and Petty 
(2014) examined the impact of processing goals in affecting elaboration.  In one study, 
participants were first asked to read the materials either with the goal of having a clear, 
informative, and accurate view of the issue or with the goal of enjoying and have fun 
with the experience of reading.  This induction was designed to manipulate the 
particular motivation to process – being informed or having fun.  Participants were also 
assigned to an extent of thinking condition by telling them that they were going to 
receive a high or low reward for their analysis of the message, respectively. Finally, all 
participants received either strong or weak arguments in favor of the same proposal and 
reported their attitudes toward it.  As expected, the goal of being entertained (vs. being 
informed) increased elaboration for low thinking conditions (i.e., larger argument 
quality effect on attitudes when the entertainment goal versus information goal was 
activated), but it reduced elaboration under high thinking conditions (i.e., smaller 
argument quality effect on attitudes when the entertainment goal versus information 
goal was activated).  
Validation 
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As we have seen, people can vary in the extent to which the elaborate on a 
message – generating relatively many or few thoughts about it. The other critical 
concept for persuasion that we highlight in this article is validation – determining if 
one’s thoughts or the attitudes formed are appropriate to rely upon (Petty, Briñol, & 
Petty, 2002; Petty & Briñol, 2012).  People can validate any accessible mental contents.  
Unlike elaboration which focuses on primary or first-order cognition (i.e., how many 
and what thoughts are generated), validation emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition 
(Briñol & DeMarree, 2012; Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007; Kruglanski, 
1979).  Most relevant to the domain of persuasion is the notion of self-validation (Petty 
et al., 2002) – the idea that people can have confidence or doubt in the validity of their 
thoughts and attitudes and these meta-cognitive reactions determine the extent to which 
people rely on their thoughts in forming attitudes and their attitudes in guiding behavior.  
The self-validation approach holds that generating thoughts is not sufficient for them to 
have an impact on attitudes, but people must also believe their thoughts are correct 
(cognitive validation) or feel good about them (affective validation).  Similarly, having 
attitudes is not sufficient for behavioral influence.  People must believe their attitudes 
are correct or feel good about them. Thoughts and attitudes that are not perceived as 
accurate or that are disliked are mentally discarded.  Thus, the ELM postulates that a 
host of familiar variables (such as happiness, source credibility, or stereotypes) can 
influence judgments and behavior not only by affecting the amount and direction of 
processing (elaboration; primary cognition) but also by affecting the use of thoughts and 
attitudes (validation; secondary cognition; see, Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a review of the 
impact of confidence on thoughts; see Rucker, Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2014, for a 
review of the impact of confidence on attitudes). 
In the domain of thought validation, if people are generating favorable thoughts 
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about a new proposal (e.g., because the message arguments are strong), they will be 
more persuaded if they are nodding their heads (Briñol & Petty, 2003) or sitting up 
straight (Briñol, Petty, & Wagner, 2009) or feeling happy (Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 
2007), powerful (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007), or self-affirmed 
(Briñol, Petty, Gallardo, and DeMarree (2007 than if they are shaking their heads, 
sitting in a slumped posture, feeling sad, or powerless or unaffirmed because the former 
variables will make people think that their positive thoughts are correct or make them 
feel good about their positive thoughts.  However, if people are generating unfavorable 
thoughts (e.g., because message arguments are weak), then these same variables (e.g., 
nodding one’s head or feeling powerful) will lead to less persuasion because people will 
have more confidence in or feel better about their negative thoughts and use these in 
forming their judgments. Thus, self-validation variables interact with the direction of 
one’s thoughts to influence judgments.  The existence of this interaction between 
direction of thoughts and the many variables mentioned that can affect self-validation of 
thoughts (either affectively or cognitively) constitutes another testable hypothesis for 
media researchers.   
In the realm of media campaigns, an important variable that can affect the 
perceived validity of one’s thoughts is the credibility of the communication source.  In 
an initial demonstration of the possibility of validating thoughts through source 
credibility, Briñol, Petty, and Tormala (2004) exposed participants to strong arguments 
in favor of the benefits of phosphate detergents.  Following receipt of the message, 
participants learned that the source of the information was either a government 
consumer agency (high credibility source) or a major phosphate manufacturer (low 
credibility source).  As predicted, participants exposed to the high (vs. low) credibility 
source had more confidence in their thoughts, relied on them more, and were therefore 
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more persuaded by the proposal. In brief, if people think the information on which their 
thoughts are based is credible, the thoughts themselves should be credible and used as 
well.  
In a follow-up study, Tormala, Briñol, and Petty (2006) predicted and found that 
because of the self-validation role for sources, a high credibility source can lead to 
either more or less persuasion than a low credibility source depending on the nature of 
people’s thoughts in response to the persuasive message.  In these experiments, 
participants were exposed to either a strong or a weak persuasive message promoting 
Confrin, a new pain relief product, and then information about the source was revealed 
(i.e., the information was said to come either from a federal agency that conducts 
research on medical products or from a high school class report written by a 14-year old 
student).  When the message contained strong arguments, high source credibility lead to 
more favorable attitudes than low source credibility because of greater reliance on the 
positive thoughts generated.  However, when the message contained weak arguments 
and participants generated mostly unfavorable thoughts, the effect of credibility was 
reversed.  That is, high source credibility produced less favorable attitudes than did low 
source credibility because participants exposed to the more credible source had more 
confidence in their unfavorable thoughts to the weak message. Next, we discuss some 
moderators of when source credibility and other variables will serve to validate 
thoughts. 
Moderators of Self-validation Effects 
In addition to specifying the impact that validation processes have on judgment, 
the self-validation approach also points to unique moderators useful in specifying the 
circumstances in which thought confidence is likely to influence judgments.  The initial 
research on self-validation processes documented two important boundary conditions.  
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First, self-validation is more likely to operate when people are engaged in a relatively 
high amount of thinking (e.g., when the issue is important or personally relevant there 
are few distractions; individuals are high in need for cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). There are at least two reasons for this.  First, for validation processes to matter, 
people need to have some thoughts to validate.  Second, people need substantial 
motivation and ability not only to think at the primary level of cognition (i.e., to 
generate thoughts) but also to think and care about their own thoughts.  
Second, the accumulated research suggests that the timing of persuasion variables 
is one of the critical moderators of primary versus secondary cognitive processes.  
Consistent with these two moderators, Tormala, Briñol, and Petty (2007) demonstrated 
that source credibility affected thought confidence only when the source information 
followed, rather than preceded the persuasive message and only when thinking was high 
rather than low.  When source information preceded the message or thinking was low, 
source credibility affected attitudes by other processes specified by the ELM.  This 
research illustrates that studies in traditional persuasion settings can benefit from 
considering the timing of the key manipulations as placement of the independent 
variable in the sequence of persuasion stimuli can have an impact on the mechanism by 
which it operates.  The same is true regarding the extent of elaboration.  
In a recent series of studies testing the application of the self-validation approach 
to attitudes related to food and using other validation inductions, Briñol, Petty, Gascó, 
and Horcajo (2013) asked people to write down either positive or negative thoughts 
about the Mediterranean diet. After doing so, they were asked to take the page on which 
they wrote their thoughts and place it in a trash can, effectively “throwing away” their 
thoughts or they were asked to fold the paper up, and keep it in a safe place such as their 
pocket, wallet, or purse.  After performing one of these actions, all participants were 
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then asked to rate their attitudes regarding the diet. As expected, results indicated that 
for people who kept their written thoughts close to them, the thoughts had a more 
pronounced effect on attitudes compared to the impact of thoughts for those who threw 
them in the trash.  A control condition in which thoughts were left on table showed 
impact in between the two experimental groups.  This research showed that detaching 
(in this case, literally) from one’s negative thoughts can produce more positive 
evaluations if thoughts are primarily negative presumably by reducing the perceived 
validity of those thoughts, but the very same treatment can also produce the opposite 
effect when thoughts are positive.   
As a final example of validation processes, consider work on prejudiced attitudes.  
In most of the social psychological research on the impact of stereotypes, group 
membership is learned before acquisition of individuating information.  When 
stereotypes precede information processing, research has shown that stereotypes can 
influence attitudes in the various ways mentioned earlier including such low elaboration 
processes  as classical conditioning or serving as a heuristic (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & 
Sherman, 1999) and such high elaboration processes as biasing one’s thoughts about a 
person (Wegener, Clark, & Petty, 2006).   
Importantly, learning of someone’s group membership “after the fact” might allow 
stereotypes to influence perceptions in a different way -- by affecting confidence in 
one’s stereotype-consistent thoughts.  In two experiments testing this possibility, Clark, 
Wegener, Briñol, and Petty (2009) gave participants information about a target person 
followed by a description designed to activate stereotypes.  When elaboration was high, 
greater thought confidence was found when the initial information produced thoughts 
that were consistent rather than inconsistent with the stereotypes that were later 
activated, and higher confidence in thoughts was associated with stronger perception-
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consistent recommendations related to the target.  When elaboration was low, however, 
stereotypes served their familiar heuristic role in judgment, and thought confidence 
played no role in judgment-related recommendations.  
In sum, two of the conditions necessary for validation processes to operate have 
been specified.  As noted, identifying these moderating conditions is important because 
variables can influence attitudes through multiple processes relevant to primary and 
secondary cognition. In the next section, we describe some new research relevant to 
media psychology, and also introduce a third, recently discovered moderating condition 
of validation. 
Elaboration and Validation in Tailoring Communications 
A well-known strategy that can increase the effectiveness of a communication in 
changing attitudes consists of altering the arguments contained in the message to match 
a person or group (e.g., using female pronouns in arguments aimed at a particular 
woman or women in general) or altering the “frame” of the message to match the 
particular concerns or identity of the message recipient (e.g., claiming the message is for 
women if that is the target audience with no change in actual content).  Matching at the 
individual level is often called personalizing whereas matching at the group level is 
often called targeting.  Although there are some distinctions that can be drawn between 
the two kinds of matching, we believe that these two strategies share important 
underlying conceptual similarities.  As we describe shortly, the similarities refer to the 
persuasive effects they produce and the processes (elaboration and validation) through 
which they operate. Therefore, in this review, we will use the more general term 
matching to refer to any tailoring, personalizing, targeting and/or customizing of 
communications to different aspects of an individual’s or group’s characteristics, and 
also to refer to any other type of fit between a person and the persuasive situation.  
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Extensive research has indicated that matching  can determine attitude change by 
invoking one of the standard mechanisms of persuasion (e.g., enhancing elaboration, 
invoking simple heuristics, self-validation, etc.; for reviews, see, Petty, Wheeler, & 
Bizer, 2000; Salovey & Wegener, 2003).   
One of the variables that has been studied most with respect to matching a 
message to recipient characteristics is self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974).  High self-
monitors are oriented toward social approval whereas low self-monitors are more 
motivated to be consistent with their internal beliefs and values.  Much research on self-
monitoring has shown that messages can be made more effective by matching the 
message to a person’s self-monitoring status.  For example, in one early study, Snyder 
and DeBono (1985) exposed high and low self-monitors to advertisements for a variety 
of products that contained arguments appealing either to the social adjustment function 
(i.e., describing the social image that consumers could gain from the use of the product) 
or to the value-expressive function (i.e., presenting content regarding the intrinsic 
quality of the product).  They found that high self-monitors were more influenced by 
ads with image content than ads with quality content.  In contrast, the attitudes of low-
self monitors were more vulnerable to messages that made appeals to values or quality.  
According to the ELM, matching messages to individual differences in self-
monitoring can influence attitudes by processes relevant to elaboration and validation. 
For example, when people are motivated and able to think, then matching can bias the 
direction of elaboration (e.g., high self-monitors are more motivated to generate 
favorable thoughts to messages that make an appeal to image rather than an appeal to 
values; Lavine & Snyder, 1996).  In contrast, when the circumstances constrain the 
likelihood of elaboration to be very low, a match of message to person is more likely to 
influence attitudes by serving as a simple cue (e.g., DeBono, 1987).  That is, even when 
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the content of the message is not processed carefully, if a source simply asserted that the 
arguments are consistent with a person’s values, a low self-monitor may be more 
inclined to agree than a high self-monitor by reasoning, “if it links to me or my values, 
it must be good.” 
Furthermore, when thinking is not already constrained by other variables to be 
high or low, matching a message to a person can increase thinking about the message.  
Research that has manipulated the quality of the message arguments along with a 
matching manipulation has shown that matching can increase persuasion when the 
message is strong but decrease it when it is weak as a result of the increased message 
elaboration that matching invokes.  For example, in one study, Petty and Wegener 
(1998) matched or mismatched messages that were strong or weak to individuals who 
differed in their self-monitoring. In this research, high and low self-monitors read image 
(e.g., how good a product makes you look) or quality (e.g., how efficient a product is) 
appeals that contained either strong (e.g., beauty or efficacy that last) or weak 
arguments (e.g., momentary beauty or efficacy).  The cogency of the arguments had a 
larger effect on attitudes when the message was framed to match rather than mismatch 
the person’s self-monitoring status indicating that matching enhanced processing of 
message quality (see also DeBono & Harnish, 1988; Fujita, et al., 2008; Howard & 
Kerin, 2011; for other matching effects). 
Matching messages with personality types can influence attitudes not only by 
affecting elaboration processes of primary cognition but also by influencing meta-
cognitive mechanisms under other circumstances.  Thus, not only elaboration but also 
validation processes are relevant for understanding matching.  For example, Evans and 
Clark (2012) recently showed that thought-confidence increased when the 
characteristics of the source (credibility vs. attractiveness) matched (vs. mismatched) 
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the characteristic of the recipient (low vs. high self-monitoring).  In line with the self-
validation logic, high (vs. low) self-monitors relied on their thoughts more when the 
source was attractive (vs. credible), which increased persuasion for positive thoughts 
but decreased persuasion for negative thoughts. As noted, this meta-cognitive role is 
more likely to occur under relatively high elaboration conditions and when the match is 
revealed following message processing. 
As another example of how a match between the person and the situation can 
validate thoughts, consider research on violent videogames.  First, there is much 
evidence suggesting that playing violent videogames increases aggressive thoughts and 
violent behaviors, while reducing positive thoughts and pro social behaviors (e.g., 
Anderson & Bushman, 2001; Anderson et al., 2010).  Second, research on individual 
differences in aggression has shown that people who score high in trait aggressiveness 
are more likely to have violent feelings, thoughts, and behaviors compare to those low 
in trait aggressiveness (Bushman, 1995; 1996; Bushman & Wells, 1998).  Furthermore, 
recent research has demonstrated that individuals who are high in trait aggressiveness 
are more resistant than their low aggressiveness counterparts when exposed to 
campaigns designed to reduce consumption of violence in the media (Cárdaba, Briñol, 
Brändle, & Ruiz-Sanromán, 2014).  Given this, how can one influence individuals who 
are high in trait aggressiveness to consume less violent media?   
A self-validation approach begins with the notion that people are likely to have 
more confidence in their thoughts when they do something that matches or fits their 
own nature rather than when the actions they engage in do not fit.  Thus, thought 
confidence might be increased if a person high (vs. low) in aggressiveness generated 
thoughts and then played a violent videogame than a more neutral videogame.  In 
accord with the self-validation logic, it is possible that individual differences in trait 
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aggressiveness and playing violent videogames could interact in predicting reliance in 
thoughts.  Ironically, even though each of these two variables (violent videogames and 
trait aggressiveness) has been associated with negative consequences, they could also 
lead to more positive outcomes when operating through validation.   
In one study designed to examine this possibility, Santos, Briñol, Cárdaba, and 
Petty (2014) first asked participants to read a strong or weak message about a new 
(fictional) company.  This manipulation was designed to influence the favorability of 
participants’ thoughts.  After generating positive or negative thoughts toward the 
company, participants were randomly assigned to play either a violent video game 
(Grand Theft Auto: Vice City) or a control video game (i.e. Burnout Paradise; 
Engelhardt, Bartholow, Kerr, & Bushman, 2011).  In order to classify participants in 
trait aggressiveness, they were asked to complete the Buss-Perry Aggression 
Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992).  Finally, participants reported their attitudes 
toward the company they read about at the beginning.  As predicted, the results showed 
that when there was a match between the aggressiveness of the person and the 
aggressiveness of the videogame, participants relied on their thoughts more than when 
there was a mismatch.  That is, in conditions that matched the level of violence (i.e., 
high trait aggressiveness and violent videogame; low aggressiveness and control, 
neutral videogame) there was a significant increase in the use of thoughts relative to 
more discrepant conditions (i.e., high aggressive people playing neutral videogames, 
and low aggressive people playing violent videogames).  Thus, matching the 
aggressiveness of the person and the situation increased the effect of one’s thoughts 
relative to mismatching those variables.  As a consequence of the impact of matching on 
thought validation, persuasion increased for positive thoughts but decreased for negative 
thoughts.   
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There are a number of psychological reasons why people trust and like their 
thoughts more when there is a match rather than a mismatch.  For example, one 
possibility is that when the situation is matched to the person, people might come to 
accept their thoughts because their thoughts “feel right” (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 
2004) or are easier to process (e.g., Lee & Aaker, 2004; Tormala, Petty, Briñol, 2002).  
In addition to these two reasons, matching can lead to more thought validation through 
other processes. For example, highly aggressive people playing violent videogames can 
feel particularly powerful, and power leads to greater confidence and use of thoughts 
(Briñol, et al., 2007). 
Among other reasons, these results are important because they reveal that, at 
least under some circumstances, aggressive people can have very positive attitudes 
when they play violent videogames.  That is, if an anti-violence message was 
constructed to elicit primarily positive thoughts in highly aggressive people, the 
research just described predicts that this message would be more effective if followed 
by playing a violent than a non-violent video game.  As noted, the influence of 
matching through this meta-cognitive validation process is particularly likely to occur if 
the situation is one of high thinking and the match becomes salient after message 
processing (Briñol & Petty, 2009).  Of course, the very same match between 
aggressiveness and violence can lead to attitude change through different processes 
under other circumstances (see Briñol, & Petty, 2006; Briñol, Tormala, & Petty, 2014, 
for reviews of the processes underlying matching effects in persuasion).   
In closing this section, it is important to note that recent research has also begun 
to examine some new moderating variables relevant to the validating effects of 
matching.  For example, in one study (Clark et al., 2013), participants were either asked 
to evaluate the message conclusion (as is implicit in most persuasion studies) or the 
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source of the message prior to receiving a message and information about the credibility 
of the message source.  In the former case, the judgment task (i.e., evaluating the 
message proposal) is irrelevant to the validating variable (source credibility), but in the 
latter case the judgment task (i.e., evaluating the source) is highly relevant.  The 
message participants received either contained strong or weak arguments for the 
proposal.  When the focus of evaluation was on the message, confidence in thoughts 
was always greater when the source was high rather than low in credibility replicating 
prior research (Tormala et al., 2006).  However, when focused on the source, confidence 
and thought use were greater when the quality of the arguments matched (e.g., weak 
arguments-low credibility) rather than mismatched (e.g., weak arguments-high 
credibility) the credibility information. 
This recent research reveals that the focus of one’s processing efforts is a key 
moderator for understanding when content-dependent versus content-independent 
effects occur in self-validation.  Indeed, these results suggest that a single factor can 
increase self-validation in one situation, but decrease it in another. As described earlier 
in this review, sources high in credibility have been found to evoke greater self-
validation relative to those who lack credibility (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004; 
Tormala, et al., 2006; 2007).  In the new studies by Clark et al. (2013), the opposite 
pattern was also observed when the context was different.  When participants 
scrutinized weak arguments in an effort to evaluate a source, greater confidence and 
attitudes that were more reflective of thoughts emerged when a communicator was low 
rather than high in credibility.  By demonstrating the moderating power of evaluative 
focus, future research could identify other content-dependent cases of self-validation 
that may guide the influence of non-source factors, such as positive mood, feelings of 
power, and many others.    
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Elaboration and Validation in Implicit Attitude Change 
The two key concepts used to organize this review (elaboration and validation) 
also serve as a link between the ELM and another model that is useful for understanding 
attitudes which focuses on their underlying structure.  According to the Meta-Cognitive 
Model (MCM, Petty & Briñol, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007), attitudes 
consist of evaluative associations (positive and negative) along with validity tags that 
can be represented in various ways, such as confidence/doubt.  Increased elaboration 
enhances attitude strength by increasing the strength (accessibility) of object-evaluation 
associations (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Fazio, 1995), and also by increasing the 
perceived validity of those evaluations (Barden & Petty, 2008; Petty et al., 1995).  The 
more valid an evaluation is perceived to be, the more it is likely to persist over time, 
resist change, and guide behavior.  In this way, degree of elaboration links directly to 
strength of an attitude.   
In addition, the MCM explains how different attitude structures and attitude 
change techniques can lead to different results on implicit (automatic) and explicit 
(deliberative self-report) measures of attitudes.  Briefly described, the MCM holds that 
automatic evaluative associations only determine explicit attitude measures to the extent 
that people endorse these associations (i.e., have confidence in or validate these links).  
However, evaluative associations -- whether validated or not -- can affect implicit 
attitude measures (see also, Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  That is, the perceived 
validity tags tend not to influence implicit/automatic measures of attitudes such as the 
implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) or the evaluative priming 
measure (Fazio et al., 1986), at least until these tags become so well learned that that are 
automatically activated.    
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These two conceptual models (ELM and MCM) have served to shed light on a 
variety of phenomenon not only relevant to attitude change but also to numerous other 
judgments, ranging from the study of prejudice to the study of the self, and beyond 
(Petty & Briñol, 2014).  In closing this review, we briefly mention two of those 
phenomenons that have relevance to media communication, implicit ambivalence and 
indirect automatic change.   
First, the MCM argues that although people might not rely upon evaluative links 
that are associated with doubt (i.e., are invalidated) when deliberatively responding to 
explicit attitude measures, those automatic associations can still influence more 
automatic measures such as the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).  Thus, in some cases 
people may have deliberative attitudes that differ from their more automatic reactions, 
producing what we have called implicit ambivalence – a form of evaluative conflict that 
can be indexed by the degree of discrepancy between explicit and implicit evaluations 
(see Petty & Briñol, 2009, for a review).  In fact, an important contribution of the MCM 
is the distinction between explicit and implicit forms of ambivalence. Sometimes a 
person recognizes that both positive and negative evaluations of some object or issue 
are valid and this person’s attitude is best described as being explicitly ambivalent 
because both positive and negative associations come to mind and are endorsed (e.g., de 
Liver et al., 2007; Priester & Petty, 1996).  At other times, however, people might have 
two opposite accessible evaluations come to mind but one is seen as valid whereas the 
other is rejected.  A denied evaluation can be a past attitude (e.g., I used to like 
smoking, but now it is disgusting; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006) or an 
association that was never endorsed but nonetheless automatically comes to mind due to 
one’s culture (e.g., from continuous depictions in the media; Olson & Fazio, 2009).  It is 
in this situation, where implicit and explicit evaluations are different, that implicit 
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ambivalence exists.  Even though people do not endorse opposite evaluations of the 
same attitude object (i.e., they are not explicitly ambivalent) they can nevertheless feel 
uncomfortable about such attitude objects without knowing the specific source of the 
conflict (see Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008; Petty, Briñol, & Johnson, 2012).  
This discomfort is consequential in that it leads people to more carefully process 
information associated with the object of their ambivalence (Petty et al., 2006; Briñol, 
Petty, & Wheeler, 2006).  Thus, researchers interested in media persuasion should 
become cognizant of not only the explicit attitudes held by their targets of influence, but 
also their implicit reactions. 
Second, just as elaboration can strengthen attitudes at the explicit level by 
increasing attitude confidence, so too does high thinking lead to strength at the 
automatic level by making attitudes more accessible, and also by increasing the 
perceived validity of those evaluations. Furthermore, if attitudes that are based on high 
elaboration are more highly linked to other relevant material in memory (see, e.g., 
McGuire, 1981; Tesser, 1978), then these attitudes should be more likely to spill over 
and influence that related material (see Crano & Chen, 1998).  In an initial study testing 
whether targeted change in one attitude could spill over to related attitudes assessed 
with an automatic attitude measure, Horcajo, Briñol, and Petty (2014) manipulated the 
likelihood of thoughtful persuasion by having a strong or weak message endorsed either 
by a numerical majority or minority of other people. Because people exposed to 
minority sources often engage in greater message processing than those exposed to 
majority sources (see Crano & Chen, 1998; Horcajo, Petty, & Briñol, 2010; Moscovici, 
Mucchi-Faina, & Maass, 1994; Mugni & Pérez, 1993), then change on indirectly linked 
topics becomes more likely as the implications of the information on the direct topic 
percolate through the cognitive system (e.g., see McGuire, 1981).  In the Horcajo et al. 
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(2013) study, students were first exposed to a message arguing that the official color of 
their university should be changed to green.  Following exposure to the message, 
instead of assessing attitudes toward the color green (the direct attitude object), 
automatic attitudes were assessed toward the brand, Heineken -- a brand associated with 
the color green.  The results showed that only in the minority source condition were 
attitudes toward Heineken more favorable as a result of the strong versus the weak 
message about the color, green.  Given that minority sources often foster more thinking 
than majority sources, these findings provide preliminary evidence suggesting that even 
with respect to automatic attitude measures, high thinking processes can be more 
consequential than low thinking processes. 
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research 
In this review, we have highlighted two of the key notions of the ELM: 
elaboration, and its implications for persuasion and attitude strength, along with the 
concept of validation, and its implications for attitude change and strength.  The concept 
of elaboration distinguishes between processes that require high and low effortful 
thinking, and highlights the importance of considering the amount and direction of the 
thoughts in determining attitudes.  The concept of validation emphasizes the distinction 
between primary and secondary cognition, and emphasize the importance of considering 
what people think and feel about their own thoughts and attitudes.  Throughout this 
review, we have provided a number of concrete, testable predictions for media 
researchers to examine the potential of these two processes for understanding the 
influence of all kinds of persuasive variables. We argued that researchers in media 
psychology could benefit from including measures beyond attitude change, such as 
assessments of objective and subjective elaboration, measures of thought-confidence, 
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indicators of attitude strength (e.g., certainty) and automatic (implicit) as well as 
deliberative (explicit) measures of attitudes.   
Furthermore, we have described a number of moderators relevant to specifying 
the conditions under which elaboration and validation processes are more likely to 
operate (e.g., timing of the variable).  We have also identified moderating variables that 
are critical for understanding variations within each of these processes. For example, 
some variables (e.g., accuracy vs. entertainment goals) are capable of increasing or 
decreasing elaboration (producing opposite effects on persuasion) as a function of other 
variables (e.g., personal relevance).  Similarly, the same variable (e.g., source 
credibility) can validate or invalidate thoughts (producing opposite effects in 
persuasion) as a function of third variables (e.g., content dependence vs. independence).  
Future research should examine additional potential moderators capable of increasing or 
decreasing either elaboration or validation as a function of individual, situational, and 
cultural differences.  
The present review also highlighted how variables related to recipients of 
communications (e.g., individual differences in self-monitoring, trait aggressiveness) 
and the situation or environment (e.g., playing violent videogames) can not only operate 
separately but also influence attitudes in combination.  We described research showing 
that matching people to situations can affect attitude change by increasing either 
elaboration or validation depending of the circumstances.  Future research should 
explore when matching can also decrease elaboration and validation under other 
conditions. For example, instead of increasing personal relevance, matching could 
sometimes give people the feeling that they already know enough about a topic, and 
therefore reduce (rather than increase) subsequent information processing. 
Alternatively, the feeling of difficulty and dis-fluency often associated with 
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mismatching might be interpreted under some conditions as a sign of effort and interest 
and personal relevance increasing the use of thoughts through validation (Briñol, Petty, 
& Tormala, 2006).  Therefore, future research should include measures of the 
subjective, perceived meaning of the key variables used in media psychology studies.  
In the final section of this review, we described a new model of attitude structure 
(MCM) which postulates that the more confidence people have in the validity of an 
automatic evaluation, the more they are likely to report it on a deliberative attitude 
measure.  In contrast, when an automatic association is rejected, increasing the doubt in 
that evaluative link, people are less likely to use it when responding to a deliberative 
measure.  In this way, the MCM has contributed to a new, more comprehensive, 
understanding of a variety of phenomenon such as ambivalence and indirect attitude 
change.  Future research in the domain of media psychology can benefit from measuring 
not only explicit but also implicit ambivalence, and by measuring not only direct 
attitude change but also other potential indirect changes. 
It is important to close by noting that sometimes variables can influence 
elaboration and validation processes without any awareness.  At other times, however, 
people can become aware of some potentially contaminating influence on their thoughts 
and judgments.  To the extent that people become aware of a possible bias and want to 
correct for it, they can take steps to debias their judgments. According to the Flexible 
Correction Model (FCM) of debiasing; Wegener & Petty, 1997), to the extent that 
people become aware of a potential contaminating factor and are motivated and able to 
correct for it, they consult their intuitive theory of the direction and magnitude of the 
bias, and adjust their judgment accordingly. Therefore, it might be also useful to assess 
perceptions of potential biases in future studies of attitude change in the domain of 
media psychology.  
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